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5SOTTO-TERZIARIZZAZIONE E DISOCCUPAZIONE
Riassunto
Il tasso di occupazione nei 15 paesi dell'EU negli ultimi due decenni, com'è
noto, è molto piu' basso rispetto a quello degli Stati Uniti. Meno noto, forse, è che
questa differenza è tutta ascrivibile al tasso di occupazione nei servizi, mentre quello
dell'industria (e dell'agricoltura) ci è favorevole. Non solo, ma tra i servizi il tasso di
occupazione di quelli finali è rimasto stazionario, mentre soltanto i servizi intermedi
hanno mostrato una buona dinamica. Sembrerebbe dunque che buona parte dei
servizi non sia stata in grado di interagire con gli altri settori, e in particolare con la
manifattura che maggiormente è stata interessata al progresso tecnico, al fine di
assorbire occupazione, creare reddito e fornire domanda.
La dimensione di questi fatti è stata messa a fuoco solo di recente, ma lo
studio delle cause e dei rimedi è ancora in una fase arretrata.
Proposito di questo paper è quello di fornire un modello in grado di spiegare,
in modo interconnesso, i fenomeni della sotto-terziarizzazione e della
disoccupazione. Il modello è a due settori, i quali sono diversi per le tecniche
adottate, uno con tecniche migliori dell'altro, mentre la loro dimensione relativa è
determinata endogenamente. La presenza di rigidità nei salari permette di ottenere
una disoccupazione che è influenzata dalla composizione settoriale. Inoltre, le
imprese sono ipotizzate come eterogenee, e questo permette di studiare come la
dimensione di ciascun settore sia dovuta al numero delle imprese piuttosto che alla
loro dimensione. E' così possibile studiare anche il fenomeno della grande
dispersione del settore distributivo italiano.
Tra le cause che deprimono il terziario e l'occupazione sono state prese in
considerazione anzitutto un insieme di provvedimenti volti a proteggere il mercato
dei servizi, e che sono invece risultati distorsivi. In secondo luogo, è stata studiata
una possibile interazione fra tasso di occupazione, domanda e offerta di beni e
servizi, tale per cui vengono determinate due posizioni di equilibrio, uno "basso" ed
uno "alto". In tal modo potrebbero essere rappresentati i casi dell'Europa e degli
Stati Uniti.
JEL Classification: E24, J23
60. Introduction
The data on employment in Europe stand in sharp contrast with those
in the US, not only, as is well-known, because the employment rate is lower,
but also because employment in the service sector is relatively very much
lower. This suggests that the problem of unemployment in Europe
necessarily involves the problem of under-tertiarisation. In particular,
employment in consumer services are expected to be still very sluggish in
Europe, if the past trend is considered, while producer services exhibit a
more dynamic and promising performance.
These facts have been recently recognised by the literature (Anxo and
Storrie 2000; European Commission 1999a; McKinsey Global Institution
1994; Freeman and Schettkat 2000; Elfring 1989; Borzaga, Demozzi and
Povinelli 1999). However, under-tertiarisation in Europe is not studied very
much, if compared to unemployment in Europe generally, maybe because the
rigidities in the labour market have focused the attention of the debate. By
contrast, when the tertiary sector is studied, the rigidities in the product
market, and especially the excessive regulations in the continental European
market, are immediately recognised as detrimental for the sector and for the
economy as whole (Sapir, Buigues and Jacquemin 1993; OECD 1991;
Koefijk and Kremers 1996; Pilat 1996). In some cases, indeed, regulations
and public monopolies are designed to protect employment, as if the roles of
absorbing unemployment and promoting growth were distinctly assigned to
services and to manufacturing respectively (Barca and Visco 1992)1. A
                                         
1 Koefijk and Kremers (1996) complain of the scarcity of studies, with respect to
the US, regarding the economic costs of regulation in Europe. Even scarcer, however, are
the studies on consumer services which are highly regulated: retail trade and particular
7second reason behind under-tertiarisation in Europe, though excluding the
Scandinavian countries, has been identified: the low participation of women
in the labour market which induces a low externalisation of household
services (Bettio e Villa 1998; Esping-Andersen 1999). Unfortunately, both in
the case of rigidities in the market of services and in this case the analysis has
been mainly remained at the empirical level2.
This paper thus proposes a model to explain under-tertiarisation in
consumer services and unemployment by focusing on specific rigidities in the
market of services. In fact, it intends to capture the following administrative
measures: a legal barrier to entry into the service sector, a legal barrier to
large service firms, a fixed cost for establishing a new business, a restraint
over service product qualities. To this aim the model is somewhat elaborated
by assuming heterogeneous ability of the entrepreneurs, which allows us to
analyse both the heterogeneous sizes and the numbers of firms of the two
sectors, manufacturing and services. Hence, changes in the productive
structure of the economy imply changes in the demand for labour, and, since
wages are assumed as not flexible, in unemployment. Finally, an attempt at
endogenising the propensity to spend into service products is proposed by
addressing to the role of women in the markets. This analysis will brings us
to the case of two equilibria, one of low employment and a small service
sector (under-tertiarisation), which is typical of Europe, and the other at a
higher position, which is typical of the US.
                                                                                            
classes like pharmacies, professional activities like notaries, road transports like taxis,
social services like childcare and elderly care.
2 Brunello and Scaramozzino (1994), who propose a two-sector model with
imperfect competition in the product market and with union’s bargaining in the labour
market, is an exception.
8The paper is organised as follows: section 1 provides some evidence
for the relevant facts to be explained; section 2 provides the benchmark
model with no rigidities in the product market; section 3 introduces examples
of policies protective of services, and studies their consequences; section 4
attempts to capture the role of women in the labour market. The conclusions
and the mathematical appendix end the paper.
1. The US-EU gap in tertiarisation and employment
Recent data show that the US economy employs, in proportion, about
one fourth more than does the European economy. More precisely, in 1997
the employment rate in the US was 74%, while in Europe it was 60.5% if the
15 EU members are considered, but in the case of continental EU members it
was 58.7 (Tab.1)3  More than one third of this last gap was due to the
sectors of Distributive trades (D) and Hotels and restaurants (HR), which are
largely oriented to final consumption. A further 0.7 point of difference, i.e.
almost 1.5 million jobs, is due to Recreational and other personal services
(R). As is well-known, the public sector in the US is smaller than in Europe,
since several functions are privatised. However, on the whole, Public
administration, education, health and social works (P) is a larger sector in the
US, by 3.4 points.
================  Tab.1 about here  ================
These gaps can hardly be explained by the higher per capita GDP of
the US. Citing the Engel law is not sufficient justification, since its prediction
is on the composition, rather than on the overall level of employment (see
                                         
3 This gap is not a statistical artefact, at least for the Germany-US gap, as Freeman
and Schettkat (2000) have shown after a close scrutinity of a special database which make
comparable German and US employment data at a very fine level of disaggregation.
9also European Commission 1999a). Moreover, under-tertiarisation is
expected to widen if the recent trends are considered. In fact, the continental
EU members have employed from 1985 to 1997 only 0.1 points more in the
D plus HR sector, and 1.6 points more in the R plus P sector, whereas the
US has employed 1.1 and 4.7 more respectively. The Finance and business
service sector has instead grown at 1.9 and 1.5 points respectively in the two
areas (European Commission 1999b:16).
These differences in the employment rates between Europe and the US
seem ironic if one bears in mind that in several European countries policy
measures were implemented precisely in order to protect employment. The
most notable example is the restriction on establishing large stores in various
countries, and especially in Italy. In fact, 83.5% of employment in Retail
trade and repair services for Italy in 1995 was in micro-enterprises with
fewer than 9 employees; followed by 75.3% for Spain, while the average for
EU-15 was 54.2%, and the figure for the UK was 27% (Eurostat 1998:46)4.
Participation by women in the labour market is important to raise
employment, and to expand the service sector. In fact, in those countries
where employment rates are relatively high, the contribution of female
employment rates are also relatively high. More precisely, the correlation
between the two across EU-15 in 1997 is 0.94. It is interesting to note that
for these recent data the correlation also indicates that a 1 point rise in the
total employment rate implies an increase of 1.3 points in the female
employment rate. This means that the male labour market tends to become
                                         
4 Ergas (1995) has found that the density of retail outlets in Italy and in Japan is
double that required by population density and distribution across the territory, and by
their ability to move, having considered the 4 biggest European countries, the US and
Japan as the sample for the regression and for the simulation. Analogous conclusions are
in OECD (1992) and Pellegrini (1993).
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saturated before the female labour market does. Inspection of individual
sectors shows that women are employed most in consumer services: 57.6%
of total employment in the R sector for EU-15 in 1995, 52.6% in HR, 76.2 in
Health and social works, as against 22.6% in Industry (Eurostat 1998:25).
Female participation in the labour market is also important on the
demand side of the services market. Their greater participation implies that
more home services are substituted by market services. This fact may justify
the positive correlation between the female employment rate and the
expenditure share for services by households. This is 0.39 for a sample of 11
EU countries plus the US in 1996-975. This coefficient would be higher if it
considered that Denmark and Sweden achieve high female employment rates
while many services are provided by the public sector. The outlier position of
the US is anyway evident: it achieves 67.5% of the female employment rate
and 58.4 of expenditure share in services, while the 11 European countries
exhibit, on average, 56.4% and 43.8% respectively6. The trend is not
                                         
5 If the expenditure share does not include transport and communication services,
the correlation coefficient is 0.49. Consistent results to these findings are obtained by
Illeris (1989), who observes a negative relationship between hours of household and hours
paid working in Denmark, and by Esping-Andersen (1999), who finds that married
women’s employment has a significant effect on employment growth in services in France,
Spain and the US.
6 Further evidence of the role of female participation in shaping the service sector is
provided by a study on the dispersion of distributive trade in 7 major economies, which
has found that the female participation rate in the labour force has a statistically
significant negative effect, thus capturing the opportunity cost of time spent shopping
(Ergas 1995). Also Freeman and Schettkat (2000) regard the substitution in household
production as important in explaining the US-German gap in employment and
tertiarisation.
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encouraging, since the US-EU gap in the expenditure share for services
widened between 1970 and 1995 (Eurostat 1998:14).
2. The benchmark model
The model proposed is essentially short-run, but it is designed to study
structural features. It belongs to the category of models of heterogeneous
talent (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1991; Rauch 1991), where the role of
entrepreneurship is central, while the role of capital is left aside. Various
aspects of the model could be elaborated further, but interesting results still
emerge from this simple version.
In this section, the model will be free of any rigidity in the product
market of services, and with an exogenous propensity to spend on services.
This is the benchmark, while the next sections will consider some variants of
it.
2.1 The distribution function of ability
Let us begin with the less usual assumptions, i.e. that the individuals in
the economy belong to the set of real numbers, that they are endowed with a
heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability in production over the relevant period,
and that they can be thus ranked smoothly and continuously. Formally this
can be represented by a cumulated function as follows:
[1] A = A(E) with 0<E £ N
where NÎR+ indicates the (exogenous) number of individuals in the
economy, as ranked in descending order of ability, E is the number of those
individuals who have chosen to become entrepreneurs, A is the cumulated
ability of the first E individuals, who are thus also the ablest. The properties
of equation [1] are: A
E +® 0
lim (E)=0, 0<A(N)<+¥ , 1< º
® +
'
0
lim A
E
a<+¥ ,
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A'(N)=1, A''<0. Hence, A'(E) represents the ability of each individual as a
function of the number of the ablest individuals. For the solution of the
model with a distribution function of the Paretian type see the Appendix.
2.2 Production functions
The economy produces two goods, a manufacturing good (m) and a
service good (s), according to the following microeconomic production
functions:
[2] ym = T A' [lm e(wm)]a with 0<b<a<1
[3] ys = Q A' [ls]b with 0<Q<T<+¥
where y indicates output, T and Q are specific exogenous indices of
efficiency, l is labour employed. The ability of each entrepreneur (A')
characterises the efficiency of his firm (cf. Lucas 1978), and is generic with
respect to the sector employed. The efficiency of labour is equal to 1 in the
service sector, while it varies with wages in manufacturing according to the
usual S-shaped function of the efficiency-wage literature (Solow 1979), and
in particular with the property that e>1 e”=0, so that maximised efficiency
will be larger than 1.
Therefore, service firms differ from manufacturing firms because of
more decreasing returns, which is crucial for the following analysis, lower
production efficiency, and a lower (maximised) labour efficiency7.
                                         
7 Detailed empirical studies on these gaps between manufacturing and services are
lacking. One of the most interesting is Pellegrini (1993), who concludes that the gap in
total factor productivity in the UK is more significant for distribution, hotels and
restaurants, than for transport and communications.
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2.3 Firms' equilibrium
Let us assume that entrepreneurs can earn all the residual from
proceeds after paying the labour cost, so that their profits can be called
quasi-rents.
Let us maximise these expected profits (p) f r manufacturing firms:
[4]
mm lw ,
max pm    where     pm = ym - lm wm
and where output has unitary prices (pm=1).
From the usual first-order conditions one obtains the equilibrium values
for effort and for wages. In fact:
[5] *
*)('
*)(
m
mm
mm w
we
we
=
which yields the equilibrium values wm* and e*. Firms’ demand for labour
can thus be derived:
[6] lm*=
aa a -
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é 1
1
*
)('*
mw
EATe
.
Let us maximise the expected profits of the service firms:
[7]
sl
max ps    where     ps = psys - ls ws
where, note, price (ps) is exogenous to firms. Let us also assume that wages
are fixed exogenously at some low level, i.e.:
[8] ws = sw < wm*.
This can be justified by a very abundant supply of labour, so that wages can
reach a minimum level of reservation.
Firm’s demand for labour can thus be derived:
[9] ls*=
bb -
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é 1
1
)('
s
s
w
EAÈp
.
Since both lm* and ls* are declining functions in E, i.e. li*'(E)<0, it
follows that the less able individuals are, the smaller the size of firms that
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they are able to manage. In particular, manufacturing firms have a larger size
than service firms if lm*>ls*. This condition can be written from equations
[7] and [9] as follows:
[10] A'(E) > ºú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é -
-
-
-
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b
aba
a
ab
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Hence, the (monotonically) declining curve representing the distribution
function A'(E) can be divided by an horizontal line (c) i to an upper part,
where manufacturing firms are larger than the service firms, and a lower part,
where the reverse is the case.
2.4 The equilibrium profits of the two sectors
An individual can choose to become entrepreneur in one of the two
sectors according to the maximum of the two expected profits (pm*, ps*),
given that:
[11] pm*(E) = T A'(E) [lm*(E) e*]a - *mw  lm*(E)
[12] ps*(E) = ps Q A'(E) [ls*(E)]b - sw  ls*(E)
and that the maximum profits are greater than wages, as specified below.
Manufacturing firms earn more or equal profits with respect to service
firms if pm* ³ ps*. This condition can be written as follows, after substituting
equations [7] and [9] into equations [11] and [12] respectively, and by using
the definition in [10]:
[13] A'(E) > c ºú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
- -
--
ba
ba
aa
bb
)1)(1(
)1(
)1(
*m
s
w
w
 b.
Let us represent this condition as in Fig.1. The curve of the ability
distribution intersects once with the horizontal line b, where the least able
individual of the Em* group is indifferent to becoming entrepreneur in one of
the two sectors. But for A'>b, the ablest individuals in the Em* group would
choose manufacturing, since pm*>ps*, while the individuals who are
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immediately less able would choose to become entrepreneurs in the service
sector. Hence, all entrepreneurs would have made the best choice once Em*
had been identified.
================  Fig.1 about here  ================
In order to capture the fact that manufacturing firms are generally
larger than service firms, except for some public utilities which more closely
resemble manufacturing corporations, the following condition must hold:
[14]
aa
bb
)1(
)1(*
-
-
£
s
m
w
w
so that c £ b (see Fig.1). This is not a severe restriction, since a small
difference in the technological parameters like a=0.5 and b=0.4 allows
manufacturing wages to be no more than 50% higher than service wages,
until the other extreme case of equal wages. Therefore, the individuals who
are so able as to find it convenient to become entrepreneurs in
manufacturing, also run larger firms than they would if they chose to run
service firms.
The number of entrepreneurs in manufacturing (Em*) varies with
changes in ps. The greater ps, the higher b (and c) from [13] (and [10]), the
lower Em*. This is evident from Fig.1, but also from Fig.2, which represents
the two equations [11] and [12] of equilibrium profits. The higher ps the
higher ps*, the lower Em*(see the Appendix for proof). Hence, we can write:
[15] Em*=Em*(ps) with    Em*'<0.
This is true, however, for an appropriate range of ps. Intuitively, a too high
ps tends to crowd out the manufacturing sector altogether, while a too low
ps tends to crowd out the service sector. To be more precise, we must also
consider the constraints in the labour market, as analysed in the section 2.5.
================  Fig.2 about here  ================
Determining the number of entrepreneurs in the service sector requires
the equality condition between expected profits by the least able individual
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who would choose entrepreneurship and his opportunity cost of being an
employee in manufacturing:
[16] ps*(E) = *mw .
This can be justified by the possibility for manufacturing firms to select
workers, and hence to select the ablest individuals. Therefore, condition [16]
gives the total number of entrepreneurs who earn equilibrium profits (ET*),
as represented in Fig.2, while entrepreneurs in the service sector is thus
simply obtained:
[17] Es* = ET* - Em*
for an appropriate range of ps. It is evident from equation [12] and Fig.2 that
the higher ps is, the larger the number of entrepreneurs in the service sector
(Es*), because this activity becomes more convenient not only w.r.t.
manufacturing entrepreneurship (reduction in Em*), but also w.r.t. working
as employees (expansion of ET*). Hence, we can write:
[18] ET*=ET*(ps) with    ET*'>0.
2.5 The labour market
Labour demand for workers in the two sectors is obtained by
aggregating labour demand by individual firms, i.e.:
[19] Lm* = ò º
*
0
d*m
E
m n(n)l  Lm*(Em*) with Lm1*>0
[20] Ls* = ò º
*
*
d*T
m
E
E s
n(n)l  Ls*(Em*,ET*) with Ls1*<0,
Ls2*>0.
Aggregate labour demand depends on the number of active firms with
fixed wages. Labour supply (N) is not binding if it is sufficiently great at
ongoing wages, i.e.:
[21] N > Em* + Es* + Lm* + Ls*.
By combining equations [15] and [19], and [18] and [20], we can
write:
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[22] Lm* = Lm(ps) with    Lm'<0
[23] Ls* = Ls(ps) with    Ls'>0.
A rise in ps makes service activity more convenient both because it improves
the service/manufacturing terms of trade, and because the optimum firm’s
size grows. This increases the number of service firms on both sides of the
spectrum by raising LT* and by reducing Lm*. The latter effect is obviously
detrimental to the manufacturing sector. The effect of ps on t tal
employment is positive if the induced change in Em* does not excessively
reduce manufacturing with respect to the gain in the service sector. A
sufficient condition for this result is that at Em* the two kinds of firms are of
equal size, i.e. that the smallest manufacturing firm is equal to the largest
service firm. This requires the sign of equality in condition [14]. Otherwise,
in the case of *mw = sw , the technological difference between the two
sectors must not be too large (see the Appendix). From these observations
on the parameters, it is reasonable to expect that a rise in service price will
induce a rise in total employment.
We are now in a position to be more precise about the bounds on the
size of the two sectors for different prices ps. A ri e in ps expands service
and total employment and reduces manufacturing employment, until, for a
certain level labelled sp , Em* and hence Lm* become zero. This is true if
labour supply is not binding, as would be seen in Fig.1 if b were brought up
to the a level for a sufficiently high ps. In this case, only the service sector
would survive. If labour supply were binding, then it could fix Em* at some
level for some appropriate level for ps< sp , but this case will no longer be
considered here. Conversely, below a sufficiently low level of ps, label ed as
s
p , service firms are not convenient to anybody, thus making Em*=ET* (as
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could be seen in the Fig.2 if ps* were sufficiently lowered)
8. In this case total
employment is at the minimum.
2.6 The relative supply curve of services
Having determined the sizes of the two sectors in terms of the number
of firms on the basis of equilibrium profits, we can obtain the sizes in terms
of output, and define the relative supply curve of services.
Output in the two sectors is given by aggregating the output of
individual firms, i.e.:
[24] Ym* = ò
*
0
d*]*)[('
mE
m n(n)elnTA
a
[25] Ys* = ò
*
*
d]*)[('T
m
E
E s
n(n)lnÈA b .
The relative output of services is thus:
[26]
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having substituted equations [7] and [9], and [15] and [18] into [24] and
[25]. This can be called the relative supply curve of services, because it
relates service price to the relative output of services. As can be easily seen,
service price positively affects the supply of services through two channels:
by expanding the size of service firms (the first term on the r.h.s.), and by
increasing their number drawing on manufacturing entrepreneurs (reduction
in Em*) and on workers (increase in ET*). The curve can be depicted as in
Fig.3.
                                         
8 Note that at this point the level of b in Fig.1 would be anyway greater than or
equal to 1.
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================  Fig.3 about here  ================
By using equations [19] and [20], it can be obtained from [26] that:
[27]
*
**
*
*
m
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m
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w
L
L
a
b
=
so that changes in the relative supply of services imply proportional changes
in relative employment in the two sectors, for any given price.
A rising supply curve of services may be surprising, since labour is not
a scarce resource by equation [21], and firms can freely enter and leave the
markets of goods and services. The scarce resource is, in fact,
entrepreneurial ability, and it is, moreover, unevenly distributed and
indivisible. A rise in the service price extracts that ability from workers and
from manufacturing, so that more service output is available.
2.7 Relative demand and equilibrium in the market of services
In order to find equilibrium prices and quantities in the market of
services, thus closing the model, we need the demand side.
A simple utility function for the economy’s individuals can be assumed,
since capital is absent and intertemporal preferences are not necessary. A
CES function is in fact assumed9:
[28] U = [ ] rrr ll
1
)1(
--- -+ ms DD     with  0£ l £ 1   and   r>-1.
The equilibrium for consumers requires relative prices equal to the
marginal rate of substitution, being Ym+Ysps ³ Dm+Dsps the budget
constraint, i.e.:
[29] ps = 
)1(
1'
' r
l
l
+-
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û
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=
m
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D
D
U
U
m
s .
                                         
9 Lucas (1988) adopts the same assumption in a model without capital.
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The elasticity of substitution between demand for services (Ds) and
demand for manufacturing products (Dm) i , as usual, s=1/(1+r)>0. Since,
by definition, the demand elasticities are
-em=
m
m
m
m
p
p
D
D dd
 and -es=
s
s
s
s
p
p
D
D dd
, then s=
s
m
s
m
m
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ee
. Hence, for constant pm, then s=es. From this condition
and from equation [29] the relative demand for services can be written thus:
[30] s
s
s
m
s p
D
D e
e
l
l -
úû
ù
êë
é
-
=
1
.
In Fig.3 this appears as the declining branch of an hyperbole with the axes as
asymptotes.
Therefore, the demand curve and the supply curve intersect once, thus
yielding, for 
*
*
*
*
m
s
m
s
D
D
Y
Y
= , the equilibrium relative price and quantity: ps*,
(Ys/Ym)*. Having determined ps*, equations [7], [9], [11] and [12] can be
solved for lm*, ls*, pm* and ps* respectively, and hence all the other
unknowns.
Note that by considering equation [27], if the relative supply curve lies
at a higher position, relative supply and relative employment are
proportionally lower if es=+¥ , thus ps remaining constant, and that relative
employment rises proportionally to ps if es=0, thus (Ys/Ym)* remaining
constant. Let us finally observe that a rise in l or es increases ps*, as  is
evident from Fig.3, and hence, from the discussion in the previous section,
not only does service employment increase but total employment rises as
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well. An attempt to endogenise l will be made in section 4, while the
interesting values for es are around unity or more, as suggested by the
literature10.
3. Does protected services protect service employment?
Since service activity is more sheltered from international competition
than manufacturing activity, it has been regulated in domestic markets by
various measures and to different degrees. Since services include very
different kinds of products, due to both market structure and methods of
production, very different protecting measures have been applied. The simple
model of the previous section obviously cannot consider them in detail.
However, it is possible to capture the essence of these measures by four
major examples, which can refer to specific parameters of the model. These
are: a legal barrier to entry in the service sector, a legal barrier to large
service firms, a fixed cost for establishing a new business, a restraint over
service product qualities.
3.1 The case of a legal barrier to entry
A simple and widely used method to protect services is to fix an
administrative barrier to entry into the market of service products. Restrictive
measures of this kind have been implemented in Italy and France for the
distributive trade, and in Italy for professional services and for the urban
                                         
10 Appelbaum and Schettkat (1999) argue for an elastic price elasticity of services,
since it is a less saturated market than manufacturing. Hence, together with a large income
elasticity for services, as Engel's Law would predict (Fuchs 1968), they are able to explain
Baumol's stylised fact of long run constant share of service output (Baumol et al. 1989).
Bollino and Rossi (1987) confirm that service prices are elastic for Italy.
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transportation of persons (OECD 1991; 1992). One reason cited for these
measures is that their purpose is to guarantee some minimum return for the
existing activities, so that the claim is that they protect employment.
However, the results from our general equilibrium model sharply contrast
with this claim.
In order to capture the barrier to entry into the service market with the
model at hand, let us assume the following restriction:
[31] sE
~ < Es*      with sE
~>0
where sE
~is the number of service firms, which is fixed exogenously by
administrative measures. Let us then label as sp
~  that particular price which
makes the profit curve for services (equation [12]) exactly define sE
~=Es*
11.
Hence, for any given price greater than sp
~ e supply of services is smaller
and the relative supply curve is at a higher position than that depicted in
Fig.3, thus generally raising equilibrium price (ps*) and reducing equilibrium
relative supply (Ys/Ym)*. If the ablest service entrepreneurs are also the ablest
to be included in the sE
~ group, then the higher position of the curve will be
due to a TE
~ =Em*+ sE
~ smaller than ET* in the equation [26], as depicted in
Fig.4. In the case of a constant ps*, which may be due to a shift in the
demand curve, or to es=+¥ , the service sector shrinks, thus reducing service
and total employment, manufacturing remaining unchanged12. I  the case of
higher ps*, or es<+¥ , and hence higher ps*, the sE
~ group shifts leftward as
indicated in Fig.4, so that manufacturing shrinks, and services enlarge firms'
size. In particular, if es=1, then expenditure ps*Ys* remains constant. This
                                         
11 This would be clear by substituting equations [15] and [18] into [17].
12 This result is also obtained if sE
~
 conversely included the least able service
entrepreneurs, and equality in condition [14] prevails.
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implies that, in presence of the barrier, service output, service and total
employment must be lower13.
================  Fig.4 about here  ================
This case also allows us to briefly discuss the problem of fixing ws. The
usual case is to assume that ws is sensitive to the labour market
disequilibrium, insofar as it approaches a possible minimum like the
reservation wage. However, in this case of a barrier to entry pure rent arises
as given by ps*( TE
~ )-wm* for every service firm, and ws can be sensitive to
rent sharing by rising, despite excess labour supply. Moreover, if ws is fix d
at a higher level than manufacturing wages, these may tend to rise as well,
thus reducing manufacturing output and employment. This is an important
analytical result since it shows that the distortions in the product market may
call for other distortions in the labour market.
Therefore, the macroeconomic effects on output and employment
exerted by the barrier to entry are negative, essentially because higher service
prices distort the allocation of entrepreneurship away from the most efficient
sector.
3.2 The case of a legal barrier to large firms
Another administrative measure – often combined with the previous
one –  is that of discouraging large firms in the service sector14. This measure
has been effectively applied in distributive trades in Italy and in France, with
the effect of maintaining a very dispersed structure. One reason for this
                                         
13 Service employment must be lower because, from equation [27], ps*Ys* is
constant, while Lm*/Ym* is lower.
14 This result also arises if the most recent information technologies, which
effectively counteract decreasing returns, are not encouraged to be implemented into the
service sector.
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restraint is that large firms and improved efficiency would destroy
employment because, the argument runs, the higher productivity would push
the smallest firms out of the market. This reasoning can be properly checked
by the model.
Let us capture the measures against large firms in the service sector by
assuming the following restriction:
[32] sl £ ls* where sl º ls*(Em*+ sE )  and  0<sE <Es*.
The profit curve for services thus appears kinked at (Em*+ sE ) as in
Fig.5. This reduces service output, thus shifting the relative supply curve
upwards. In the case of constant ps* (ores=+¥ ), the service sector shrinks,
but the manufacturing sector expands. If the enterprises that pass to
manufacturing do not greatly change in size, i.e. condition [14] is read as
being of little or no inequality, then also total employment diminishes. A
higher equilibrium price raises the convenience of services, and in particular
induces the ablest employees to become entrepreneurs of small size firms. In
particular, if es=1, the rise in ps* is not yet able to enlarge service output to
the benchmark level of no barrier, so that manufacturing firms remain more
numerous than Em*, but it is able to obtain more employment in the service
sector than the benchmark level15. With a larger manufacturing output,
equation [27] implies a lower Ls*/Lm*.
================  Fig.5 about here  ================
Therefore, the legal barrier to large firms has the effect of expanding
service employment by raising prices and by activating small units, although
it is not able to raise relative service employment. The higher prices have the
role of maintaining more employment by redistributing real resources from
                                         
15 In fact, at es=1 the manufacturing sector includes less efficient firms, thus
lowering Ym*/Lm*, while ps*Ys* is constant, so that Ls* is higher, as derived from
equation [27].
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profits in the manufacturing sector through expenditure on service products
to service employment, which are spread over a large number of small units.
If this kind of measure is combined with the previous measure of
raising a barrier to entry, then the service price must be even higher, while
employment in both services and manufacturing may diminish.
3.3 The case of fixed costs of establishing a new business
Regulations in Europe, and especially in continental Europe, have been
recently recognised as significant transaction costs over production. In
particular, regulations on establishing new businesses are particularly
restrictive in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, followed by France, Italy,
Denmark and Greece (Koefijk and Kremers 1996). These measures, and all
those measures that bear down proportionally more on small rather than
large firms can be captured by a fixed cost over production for each firm, so
that profits in both sectors must be reduced by a fixed amount. The two
profits curves in Fig.2 will thus lie in a downward position, with the effect of
reducing ET*, while Em* remains the same. Again, the relative supply curve
of services will be in an upward position, thus raising prices and reducing
services on equilibrium. More precisely, es=1 implies a lower Ys* and, since
the higher ps* makes ps* more attractive, a lower Ym*, and thus Lm*. For
equation [27] Ls* is lower, and thus LT*.
Therefore, a fixed cost for every firm damages service employment or
manufacturing employment more depending on the possibility of its transfer
onto service prices.
3.4 The case of restraints of new qualities of services
In various European countries, especially in the Netherlands, Germany,
Denmark and Italy, shop opening hours and shop locations are
administratively restricted, thus hindering a more flexible service to
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consumers. The production of other consumer services in continental Europe
are discouraged, if not impeded, by restrictive regulations or monopolistic
positions of the public sector, like childcare and care of the elderly.
An overall restraint in the quality of services can be captured by the
model simply by assuming a lower level of  in the demand function, i.e. a
lower propensity to spend on service goods with respect to manufacturing
goods. It is evident what the model predicts in this case: a lower service
price, which is however paid for a worse quality, lower employment both in
services and in the economy as a whole. If this case is combined with one of
the previous cases where the relative supply curve lies at a higher position,
the overall effect will be the tendency toward low total employment and
service employment, and toward low service quality for the same prices.
4. Endogenising the propensity to spend into services
This section will show how the model can be extended by endogenising
one key parameter, l, the propensity to spend into service products. The
proposal can be considerably refined, but this sketch is already able to
capture a well-known fact which plays an important role in under-
tertiarisation on the demand side of the product market, and which can be
effectively matched with the aspects on the supply side analysed in the
previous section. This fact is the low participation of women in the labour
market, which is particularly characteristic of Mediterranean Europe.
Let us recall two related stylised facts. First, as briefly shown in section
1, the relationship between the total employment rate and the female
employment rate is not simply close and positive, it is also non-linear.
Recently, European countries have experienced an acceleration in the female
employment rate, while the US displays a small gap between the two rates.
27
Hence, the labour market for men, for various reasons16, become  saturated
before that for women. The secondly, it is usually recognised that, within the
traditional division of labour in the family, women work as the best
substitutes for marketed services. Hence, it may be expected that for middle-
range rates of employment, the contribution of female rates grow
increasingly higher, and consequently also the expenditure on consumer
services. It might also be expected that, for high rates of employment, the
contribution of female rates slow as they approach unity, and, additionally,
that the expenditure share in services tends to stop increasing.
Therefore, these facts can be synthesised into an S-shaped relationship
as depicted in Fig.6 and specified as follows:
[31] L(ll = T*/N)
with the following properties: l’>0; l”>0 for l<lflex, and l”<0 for l>lflex,
being l(0)<lflex <l(1); l(0)>0 and l(1)<1, thus assuming some amount of
both goods in the consumption basket for every employment rate.
================  Fig.6 about here  ================
From the relative demand for (equation [26]) and relative supply of
services (equation [30]), and from the discussion on the positive effects of
service prices on total employment in the previous section, one can derive a
monotonic positive relationship which links LT* to l, i.e.:
[32] LT* / N = LT*(l)
                                         
16 On the demand side, firm usually prefer to employ men rather than women, on
the supply side, women may prefer to postpone work until after maternity (cf. Rubery et al.
1998).
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where, for l® 0 then LT*® Lm*, and for l® 1 then LT*® Ls*
17. Fig.6
depicts the possibility of three intersections between the two curves
representing equations [31] and [32]. The extreme points of intersection are
of stable equilibrium. In fact, a very low starting value of LT*, for example,
would mean particularly less employment for women, and thus a reduced
demand for services. This is however sufficient to stimulate, though at a
decreasing rate, more service output, which particularly employs women. An
analogous reasoning applies to the other starting values of LT*.
It is tempting to interpret the “low” equilibrium as representing the
case of continental Europe, and the “high” equilibrium the case of the US.
The distortions in entrepreneurship analysed in previous sections 3.1 and 3.3
induce the LT*(l) curve in Fig.6 to lie at a higher position, and the restriction
in quality of services of section 3.4 i duces the l(LT*/N) curve to lie at a
lower position. Therefore, not only can adequate liberalisation policies in
continental Europe increase employment, and the production of services in
particular, but they can also trigger a further expansionary process, if these
policies make the two curves intersect only at the high position.
5. Conclusions
The literature on the unemployment gap between Europe and the US is
huge; yet little attention is paid to the fact that the gap would be substantially
reduced if consumer services in Europe were raised by the US proportion.
Two reasons account for this European under-tertiarisation: excessive
regulation and low externalisation of household services. The model set out
                                         
17 Total working age population may be insufficient, even if completely employed
in the service sector, for producing the services required, so that for LT* =Ls*=N then
l(N)<1.
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in this paper studies how these two explanations work, and how they
interact.
There are three key assumptions of the model: heterogeneous
entrepreneurial ability, inflexible wages, and more decreasing returns in the
service sector with respect to manufacturing. The first assumption allows
distinct determination of the equilibrium level of the number and size of
firms. The second assumption is useful to allow for equilibrium
unemployment, the level of which is affected by the proportion of the two
sectors, which is determined by the third assumption.
Excessive regulation in the European countries is distinguished into
four examples, which refer to specific parameters or variables of the model.
First, the legal barriers to entry into the service sector are captured by fixing
the number of service enterprises at a lower level than the equilibrium level.
Second, the legal barriers to large service firms are raised by fixing a
maximum size for service firms. Third, the costs of establishing a new
business are captured by a fixed cost per firm. Fourth, the restraint over
service product qualities is captured by a lower propensity to spend on
service products. Three out of the four measures have the effect of causing a
deterioration in the employment performance of both the service sector and
the economy as a whole, if a unitary or elastic service price elasticity is
considered. Only the barriers to large firms are able to increase employment
by establishing new very small businesses, but at the cost of particularly
raising prices. The case of the barriers to entry highlights the problem that
the rent arising tempts employees to increase wages, thus hindering the
possible adjustment of the labour market through flexible wages. Therefore,
an explanation of the US-EU gap in employment can be found in the
regulatory rigidities in the market of services even if rigidities in the labour
market were the same in the two areas. But the mechanism of rent sharing
can also explain a different rigidity in wages.
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Another and complementary explanation can be found in the role of
female participation in the labour market, which is captured by the model by
endogenising the propensity to spend on service products. In fact, if this
positively depends on the female employment rate, then it also depends on
the total employment rate. This relationship can thus be matched with the
reverse one already obtained by the model, which has the employment rate
positively depending on the propensity to spend on services. One or more
points of equilibrium may arise as intersections between the two
relationships. The interesting outcome of two stable equilibria is more likely
to arise if the propensity to spend on services positively depends on female
employment rates until a point of saturation of the service market has been
reached, and if female employment rates contribute, first, to a lagging behind
of the total employment rate, when the labour market for men is far from
saturation, and then to its acceleration. The outcome of two equilibria is
interesting because the equilibrium of low employment and under-
tertiarisation can effectively represent the European case, while the other
“better” equilibrium can represent the US.
A general policy implication to be drawn from this analysis is that
closer attention should be paid to the regulations of the product market of
consumer services. Some reduction in these regulations seems advisable, but
an incentive for new qualities in services could also be interesting. In the case
of distributive trades a high dispersion of units should be discouraged in
order to reduce the price level. These measures may fuel the virtuous circle
from a higher demand for services to higher supply of services, and thus to
women and total employment, and back to higher demand (cf. Boitani and
Pellegrini 1997).
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Mathematical appendix
Let us assume an explicit cumulated distribution function of ability:
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with derivative as:
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which is a distribution function of the Paretian type. This is a handy and
familiar distribution, although some caution is needed in interpreting the
ability of the ablest individual.
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where for the sign of equality, the equilibrium value Em* is obtained, and for
E<Em*  manufacturing firms are larger than service firms, while for E>Em*
service firms are larger than manufacturing firms, though remaining smaller
than both kinds  of firms with respect to the previous case of E<Em*. If
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, the only different result is that, for E>Em*, condition
[10.A] can be applied, i.e. the ablest entrepreneurs in the service sector run
smaller firms than manufacturing sector, though they are preferred because
of greater profits.
From [13.A] it can be derived that:
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Sectoral labour demand can be obtained in explicit forms:
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It is now relevant to study how a change in ps changes LT*, which is
the sum of Ls* and Lm*. In fact, a rise in ps displays four effects on LT*. It
increases the size of service firms, it increases their number by raising ET*
and by reducing Em*, it reduces manufacturing firms by reducing Em*. I
formulae:
s
T
p
L
¶
¶ *
=
b-1
1
s
s
p
L *
+
1
1
g s
T
p
E *
ls*(ET*)
+
)(
1
1 bag
a
-
-
s
m
p
E * [ ]*)(**)(* mmms ElEl - .
The first three effects overcome the fourth, if the difference in the last term,
which is negative, is not too large, i.e. if 
s
m
w
w *
 is close to 
aa
bb
)1(
)1(
-
-
.
34
References
Anxo D and D Storrie (2000) (eds.) The Job Creation Potential of the
Service sector in Europe, Centre for European Labour Market Studies,
Sweden (mimeo)
Appelbaum E and R Schettkat (1999) Are prices unimportant? The changing
structure of the industrialised economies, Journal of Post Keynesian
Economics, 21(3), 385-98
Barca F and I Visco (1992) L’economia italiana nella prospettiva europea:
terziario protetto e dinamica dei redditi nominali, Temi di discussione,
Banca d’Italia, no.175, luglio
Baumol WJ, SAB Blackman, and EN Wolff (1989) Productivity and
American Leadership, Cambridge:MIT Press
Bettio F and P Villa (1998) A mediterranean perspective on the breackdown
of the relationship between participation and fertility, Cambr dge
Journal of Economics, 22, 137-171
Boitani A and G Pellegrini (1997) Lo sviluppo di nuove attività produttive: i
servizi, in L Ciocca (ed.) Disoccupazione di fine secolo, Boringhieri,
Torino, 203-267
Bollino CA and N Rossi (1987) L’analisi della domanda in Italia, Studi e
Informazioni, no.4
Borzaga C, M Demozzi and F Povinelli (1999) L’evoluzione settoriale
dell’occupazione e le performance occupazionali: un’analisi
comparata di lungo periodo, Università di Trento (mimeo)
Brunello G and P Scaramozzino (1992) Mark-ups in the product and in the
labour markets: the Baumol model revisited, University of Venice,
Discussion Paper, no.92-13
35
Elfring T (1989) New evidence on the expansion of service emplyment in
advanced economies, R view of Income and Wealth, 35(4), 409-440
Ergas H (1995) Structure and change in distribution system: an analysis of
seven OECD member countries, in E Felli, FC Rosati and G Tria (eds)
The service sector: productivity and growth, Heidelberg:Springer,
pp.177-242
Esping-Andersen G (1999) Social foundations of postindustriual economies,
Oxford University Press, Oxford
European Commission (1999a) Employment in Europe, Bruxelles
European Commission (1999b) Employment performance in the member
states, Bruxelles
Eurostat (1998) Services in Europe. Data 1995, Luxembourg
Freeman RB and R Schettkat (2000) Differentials in service industry
employment growth: Germany and the US in the comparable German
American structural database, Report prepared for European
Commission (mimeo)
Fuchs V (1968) The service economy, New York:Columbia Univesrity Press
Illeris S (1989) Services and regions in Europe, Aldershot:Avebury
Koefijk K and J Kremers (1996) Marketing opening, regulation and growth
in Europe, Economic Policy. An European Forum, 0(23), 443-60
Lucas RE (1988) On the mechanics of economic development, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 22, 3-42
Lucas, RE (1978) On the Size Distribution of Business Firms. Bell Journal
of Economics,  9, 508-523.
McKinsey Global Institution (1994) Employment performance, Washington
D.C.
Murphy KM, A Shleifer and RW Vishny (1991). The Allocation of Talent:
Implications for Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(May),
503-530.
36
OECD (1991) Economic survey. Italy, Paris
OECD (1992) Structure and change in distribution system, ECU/CPEWP
(92)7, Sept.
Pellegrini (1993) La produttività nei servizi destinabili alla vendita: nuove
evidenze per un vecchio problema, Temi di discussione, Banca d’Italia,
no.212, nov.
Pilat D (1996) Competition, productivity and efficiency, OECD Studies,
0(27), 108-46
Rauch JE (1991). Modelling the Informal Sector Formally, Journ  of
Development Economics, 35, 33-47
Rubery J, M Smith, C Fagan and D Grimshaw (1998) Women and European
Employment, Routledge, London
Sapir A, P Buigues and A Jacquemin (1993) European competition policy in
manufacturing and services: a two-speed approach?, Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, 9(2), 113-32
Solow (1979) Another possible source of wage stickiness, Journal of
Macroeconomics, vol.1, 79-82
37
TABLE AND FIGURES
Tab.1 Employment rates in 1997 in Europe and selected EU members, and in the US
                                        Employment over working age populaton
Total
Of which:
Services Of which:
Distributive
       Trades
Hotels and
Restaurants
Public admi.
Education
Health
Recreational
Personal, &
Other
servic.
Germany
Spain
France
Italy
UK
EU15
Continental EU
US
US-EU15
US-Cont. EU
61.8
48.6
60.1
51.3
70.8
60.5
58.7
74.0
13.5
15.3
36.8
29.8
40.9
31.6
50.4
39.2
37.2
54.2
15.0
17.0
8.8
8.1
8.1
8.6
11.0
9.1
8.8
12.1
3.0
3.5
2.0
3.0
2.0
2.3
3.3
2.5
2.3
5.4
2.9
3.1
14.7
8.9
16.5
11.1
17.7
14.7
14.2
17.6
2.9
3.4
3.1
2.9
3.9
2.4
3.7
3.1
3.1
3.8
0.7
0.7
Source :  European Commission (1999b) Employment performance in the member states, Bruxelles, tabb. 1,2,3
               Some elaborations
38
0 E
c
b
a
A'(E)
E* (ranked)
1
m N
Fig. 1.
39
0 E
Tw*
E* E*m T
p*
p*
p*
m
s
Fig. 2.
40
0
Y*
p
p
_
_
Y*
s
m
supply curve
s
s
p*s
demand curve
sY   *
mY
(   )
Fig. 3.
41
0 E
E* T
p*
p*
p*
m
s
E* m
 TE*
Fig. 4.
42
0 EE*m
p*
p*
p*
m
s
E*+E E*m  s  T
Fig. 5.
43
0
L */N
s
l
m L */N
T
L */N
1
1
l=l(         )
(l)
L */N
L */N=L*
T
T            T
Fig. 6.
44
Elenco dei papers del Dipartimento di Economia
1989. 1. Knowledge and Prediction of Economic Behaviour: Towards A Constructivist Approach. by
Roberto Tamborini.
1989. 2. Export Stabilization and Optimal Currency Baskets: the Case of Latin AmericanCountries. by
Renzo G.Avesani Giampiero M. Gallo and Peter Pauly.
1989. 3. Quali garanzie per i sottoscrittori di titoli di Stato? Una rilettura del rapporto della
Commissione Economica dell'Assemblea Costituente di Franco Spinelli e Danilo Vismara.
(What Guarantees to the Treasury Bill Holders? The Report of the Assemblea Costituente Economic
Commission Reconsidered by Franco Spinelli and Danilo Vismara.)
1989. 4. L'intervento pubblico nell'economia della "Venezia Tridentina" durante l'immediato dopoguerra
di Angelo Moioli.
(The Public Intervention in "Venezia Tridentina" Economy in the First War Aftermath by Angelo Moioli.)
1989. 5. L'economia lombarda verso la maturità dell'equilibrio agricolo-commerciale durante l'età delle
riforme di Angelo Moioli.
(The Lombard Economy Towards the Agriculture-Trade Equilibrium in the Reform Age by Angelo
Moioli.)
1989. 6. L'identificazione delle allocazioni dei fattori produttivi con il duale. di Quirino Paris e di
Luciano Pilati.
(Identification of Factor Allocations Through the Dual Approach by Quirino Paris and Luciano Pilati.)
1990. 1. Le scelte organizzative e localizzative dell'amministrazione postale: un modello intrpretativo.di
Gianfranco Cerea.
45
(The Post Service's Organizational and Locational Choices: An Interpretative Model by Gianfranco
Cerea.)
1990. 2. Towards a Consistent Characterization of the Financial Economy. by Roberto Tamborini.
1990. 3. Nuova macroeconomia classica ed equilibrio economico generale: considerazioni sulla pretesa
matrice walrasiana della N.M.C. di Giuseppe Chirichiello.
(New Classical Macroeconomics and General Equilibrium: Some Notes on the Alleged Walrasian Matrix
of the N.C.M.by Giuseppe Chirichiello.)
1990. 4. Exchange Rate Changes and Price Determination in Polypolistic Markets. by Roberto
Tamborini.
1990. 5. Congestione urbana e politiche del traffico. Un'analisi economica di Giuseppe Folloni e
Gianluigi Gorla.
(Urban Congestion and Traffic Policy. An Economic Analysis by Giuseppe Folloni and Gianluigi Gorla.)
1990. 6. Il ruolo della qualità nella domanda di servizi pubblici. Un metodo di analisi empirica  di Luigi
Mittone.
(The Role of Quality in the Demand for Public Services. A Methodology for Empirical Analysis by Luigi
Mittone.)
1991. 1. Consumer Behaviour under Conditions of Incomplete Information on Quality: a Note by Pilati
Luciano and Giuseppe Ricci.
1991. 2. Current Account and Budget Deficit in an Interdependent World by Luigi Bosco.
1991. 3. Scelte di consumo, qualità incerta e razionalità limitata di Luigi Mittone e Roberto Tamborini.
46
(Consumer Choice, Unknown Quality and Bounded Rationality by Luigi Mittone and Roberto
Tamborini.)
1991. 4. Jumping in the Band: Undeclared Intervention Thresholds in a Target Zone by Renzo G.
Avesani and Giampiero M. Gallo.
1991. 5 The World Tranfer Problem. Capital Flows and the Adjustment of Payments by Roberto
Tamborini.
1992.1 Can People Learn Rational Expectations? An Ecological Approach by Pier Luigi Sacco.
1992.2 On Cash Dividends as a Social Institution by Luca Beltrametti.
1992.3 Politica tariffaria e politica informativa nell'offerta di servizi pubblici di Luigi Mittone
(Pricing and Information Policy in the Supply of Public Services by Luigi Mittone.)
1992.4 Technological Change, Technological Systems, Factors of Production by Gilberto Antonelli and
Giovanni Pegoretti.
1992.5 Note in tema di progresso tecnico di Geremia Gios e Claudio Miglierina.
(Notes on Technical Progress, by Geremia Gios and Claudio Miglierina).
1992.6 Deflation in Input Output Tables by Giuseppe Folloni and Claudio Miglierina.
1992.7 Riduzione della complessità decisionale: politiche normative e produzione di informazione di
Luigi Mittone
(Reduction in decision complexity: normative policies and information production by Luigi Mittone)
47
1992.8 Single Market Emu and Widening. Responses to Three Institutional Shocks in the European
Community by Pier Carlo Padoan and Marcello Pericoli
1993.1 La tutela  dei soggetti "privi di mezzi": Criteri e procedure per la valutazione della condizione
economica  di Gianfranco Cerea
(Public policies for the poor: criteria and procedures for a novel means test by Gianfranco Cerea )
1993.2 La tutela dei soggetti "privi di mezzi": un modello matematico per la rappresentazione della
condizione economica  di Wolfgang  J. Irler
(Public policies for the poor: a mathematical model for a novel means test by  Wolfgang  J.Irler)
1993.3 Quasi-markets and Uncertainty: the Case of General Proctice Service by Luigi Mittone
1993.4 Aggregation of Individual Demand Functions and Convergence to Walrasian Equilibria by Dario
Paternoster
1993.5 A Learning Experiment with Classifier System: the Determinants of the Dollar-Mark Exchange
Rate by Luca Beltrametti, Luigi Marengo and Roberto Tamborini
1993.6  Alcune   considerazioni   sui   paesi   a   sviluppo   recente    di    Silvio    Goglio
(Latecomer Countries: Evidence and Comments by Silvio Goglio)
1993.7   Italia    ed    Europa:    note    sulla    crisi    dello    SME     di    Luigi   Bosco
( Italy and Europe: Notes on the Crisis of the EMS by Luigi Bosco)
1993.8 Un contributo all'analisi del mutamento strutturale nei modelli input-output di Gabriella Berloffa
(Measuring Structural Change in Input-Output Models: a Contribution by Gabriella Berloffa)
1993.9 On Competing Theories of Economic Growth: a Cross-country Evidence  by Maurizio Pugno
48
1993.10 Le obbligazioni comunali di Carlo Buratti (Municipal Bonds by Carlo Buratti)
1993.11 Due saggi sull'organizzazione e il finanziamento della scuola statale di Carlo Buratti
(Two Essays on the Organization and Financing of Italian State Schools by Carlo Buratti
1994.1 Un'interpretazione della crescita regionale: leaders, attività indotte e conseguenze di policy di
Giuseppe Folloni e Silvio Giove.
(A Hypothesis about regional Growth: Leaders, induced Activities and Policy by Giuseppe Folloni and
Silvio Giove).
1994.2 Tax evasion and moral constraints: some experimental evidence by Luigi Bosco and Luigi
Mittone.
1995.1 A Kaldorian Model of Economic Growth with Shortage of Labour and Innovations by Maurizio
Pugno.
1995.2 A che punto è la storia d'impresa? Una riflessione storiografica e due ricerche sul campo a cura
di Luigi Trezzi.
1995.3 Il futuro dell'impresa cooperativa: tra sistemi, reti ed ibridazioni di Luciano Pilati.
(The future of the cooperative enterprise: among systems, networks and hybridisation by Luciano Pilati).
1995.4 Sulla possibile indeterminatezza di un sistema pensionistico in perfetto equilibrio finanziario di
Luca Beltrametti e Luigi Bonatti.
(On the indeterminacy of a perfectly balanced social security system by Luca Beltrametti and Luigi
Bonatti).
1995.5 Two Goodwinian Models of Economic Growth for East Asian NICs by Maurizio Pugno.
49
1995.6 Increasing Returns and Externalities: Introducing Spatial Diffusion into Krugman's Economic
Geography by Giuseppe Folloni and Gianluigi Gorla.
1995.7 Benefit of Economic Policy Cooperation in a Model with Current Account Dynamics and Budget
Deficit by Luigi Bosco.
1995.8 Coalition and Cooperation in Interdependent Economies by Luigi Bosco.
1995.9 La finanza pubblica italiana e l'ingresso nell'unione monetaria europea di Ferdinando Targetti.
(Italian Public Finance and the Entry in the EMU by Ferdinando Targetti)
1996.1 Employment, Growth and Income Inequality: some open Questions by Annamaria Simonazzi and
Paola Villa.
1996.2 Keynes' Idea of Uncertainty: a Proposal for its Quantification by Guido Fioretti.
1996.3 The Persistence of a "Low-Skill, Bad-Job Trap" in a Dynamic Model of a Dual Labor Market by
Luigi Bonatti.
1996.4   Lebanon:  from  Development  to  Civil  War  by  Silvio  Goglio.
1996.5 A Mediterranean Perspective on the Break-Down of the Relationship between Participation and
Fertility by Francesca Bettio and Paola Villa.
1996.6  Is  there  any  persistence  in  innovative  activities?  by Elena Cefis.
1997.1 Imprenditorialità nelle alpi fra età moderna e contemporanea a cura di Luigi Trezzi.
1997.2 Il costo del denaro è uno strumento anti-inflazionistico? di Roberto Tamborini.
50
(Is the Interest Rate an Anti-Inflationary Tool? by Roberto Tamborini).
1997.3   A   Stability   Pact   for   the   EMU?   by   Roberto   Tamborini.
1997.4    Mr    Keynes   and   the   Moderns   by   Axel    Leijonhufvud.
1997.5    The    Wicksellian   Heritage    by    Axel   Leijonhufvud.
1997.6 On pension policies in open economies by Luca Beltrametti and Luigi Bonatti.
1997.7 The Multi-Stakeholders Versus the Nonprofit Organisation by Carlo Borzaga and Luigi Mittone.
1997.8 How can the Choice of a Tme-Consistent Monetary Policy have Systematic Real Effects? by Luigi
Bonatti.
1997.9 Negative Externalities as the Cause of Growth in a Neoclassical Model by Stefano Bartolini and
Luigi Bonatti.
1997.10 Externalities and Growth in an Evolutionary Game by Angelo Antoci and Stefano Bartolini.
1997.11 An Investigation into the New Keynesian Macroeconomics of Imperfect Capital Markets by
Roberto Tamborini.
1998.1 Assessing Accuracy in Transition Probability Matrices by Elena Cefis and Giuseppe Espa.
1998.2 Microfoundations: Adaptative or Optimizing? by Axel Leijonhufvud.
1998.3 Clower’s intellectual voyage: the ‘Ariadne’s thread’ of continuity through changes by Elisabetta
De Antoni.
51
1998.4 The Persistence of Innovative Activities. A Cross-Countries and Cross-Sectors Comparative
Analysis by Elena Cefis and Luigi Orsenigo
1998.5 Growth as a Coordination Failure by Stefano Bartolini and Luigi Bonatti
1998.6 Monetary Theory and Central Banking by Axel Leijonhufvud
1998.7 Monetary policy, credit and aggregate supply: the evidence from Italy by Riccardo Fiorentini and
Roberto Tamborini
1998.8 Stability and multiple equilibria in a model of talent, rent seeking, and growth by Maurizio Pugno
1998.9 Two types of crisis by Axel Leijonhufvud
1998.10 Trade and labour markets: vertical and regional differentiation in Italy by Giuseppe Celi e
Maria Luigia Segnana
1998.11 Utilizzo della rete neurale nella costruzione di un trading system   by Giulio Pettenuzzo
1998.12 The impact of social security tax on the size of the informal economy   by Luigi Bonatti
1999.1 L’economia della montagna interna italiana: un approccio storiografico, a cura di Andrea
Leonardi e Andrea Bonoldi.
1999.2 Unemployment risk, labour force participation and savings, by Gabriella Berloffa e Peter
Simmons
1999.3 Economia sommersa, disoccupazione e crescita, by Maurizio Pugno
52
1999.4 The nationalisation of the British Railways in Uruguay, by Giorgio Fodor
1999.5 Elements for the history of the standard commodity, by Giorgio Fodor
1999.6 Financial Market Imperfections, Heterogeneity and growth, by Edoardo Gaffeo
1999.7 Growth, real interest, employment and wage determination, by Luigi Bonatti
2000.1 A two-sector model of the effects of wage compression on unemployment and industry distribution
of employment, by Luigi Bonatti
2000.2 From Kuwait to Kosovo: What have we learned? Reflections on globalization and peace, by
Roberto Tamborini
2000.3 Metodo e valutazione in economia. Dall’apriorismo a Friedman , by Matteo Motterlini
2000.4 Under tertiarisation and unemployment. by Maurizio Pugno
53
PUBBLICAZIONE REGISTRATA PRESSO IL TRIBUNALE DI TRENTO
